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Abstract
Trust is often considered a determinant of economic performance.
The exogeneity of trust, however, is questionable. We develop a model
with heterogeneous agents to determine aggregate trustworthiness,
trust, and output. People differ according to their risk aversion (cau-
tion). The distribution of risk aversion across individuals – along with
the threat of punishment – is critical in the process by which trust is
formed. More cautious societies supposedly have less trust. We call
this the direct effect. There is an indirect effect that works through
trustworthiness and it leads to more trust. Paradoxically, the net ef-
fect may be positive – more caution leads to more trust – especially in
∗We wish to thank participants at the University of South Carolina Department of
Economics Seminar series, especially Nancy Buchan, Melayne McInnes, and Chun-Hui
Miao, for helpful comments.
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homogenous societies. In heterogeneous societies, the reverse is true.
We also show that trust and output are simultaneously determined,
and not monotonically related across countries.
JEL Codes: Z1, C7
1 Introduction
In recent decades, several empirical studies have linked trust to various per-
formance measures across countries. But what does this work mean if trust
is endogenous? Trust derives meaning in an environment of uncertainty over
the trustworthiness of a counterparty, and requires a commitment to make
resources vulnerable to the behavior of that counterparty. This suggests that
trust is determined by both individual risk aversion and the perception of
others’ trustworthiness. Our purpose in this paper is to clarify the nature of
these relationships.
Linking trust to trustworthiness is not a new idea. This idea was present
in the work of Gambetta (1988), Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993), and
Fukuyama (1995). More recently, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that trust and
trustworthiness rise when experimental subjects are closer to each other so-
cially. Breuer and McDermott (2008) show that a measure of intrinsically
trustworthy agents is a good predictor of high-quality institutions, trust, and
output. In his inquiry into the determinants of trust, Fehr (2008) reads the
evidence from experiments as consistent with the idea that beliefs about oth-
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ers’ trustworthiness are crucial for the formation of trust. Tabellini (2006)
constructs an evolutionary model of value transmission across generations to
show how cooperation arises from innate preferences and social distance.
Caution has more recently been linked to trust. The idea is that people
who do not trust may be simply fearful – have an excess of caution or risk
aversion. This literature may have been prompted, in part, by dissatisfac-
tion with the standard trust question.1 In any case, in their experiments,
Schechter (2007) and Karlan (2005) find support for a link between trust
and caution, whereas Eckel and Wilson (2004) do not.2
Our contribution is to introduce a continuum of heterogenous agents by
risk aversion into a basic trust game to derive aggregate measures of trust-
worthiness, trust, and output. We think of the distribution of caution across
individuals as an artifact of culture and we categorize societies by the mean
and dispersion of this distribution. Our results are derived in this cross cul-
tural context.
In the game, there are two types of agents, Type A and Type B. Type A
agents extend trust to B agents who may respond trustworthily or not. To
develop a role for caution, we endow each agent with her own risk aversion,
1This is question a165 in the World Values Survey (2006). It has been used in the
General Social Survey as well.
2The literature on trust in economics is vast. See Fehr (2008) and Buchan (2009) for
literature reviews. One branch relates measures of trust at the national or regional level
to economic performance. Seminal papers include Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta
et al. (1997), and Zak and Knack (2001). Another branch uses experiments and surveys
to measure trust in individuals. Examples include Ashraf et al. (2006), and Berg et al.
(1995), as well as those noted in the text.
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identically distributed across both A and B types. The endowment of risk
aversion is a key factor in the decisions of both A and B because it influ-
ences the expected utility of choices for each player. We introduce one other
wrinkle regarding B-agents. A small fraction of B agents are intrinsically
trustworthy. All of the others are opportunists. The intrinsically trustworthy
behave honestly regardless of their aversion to risk. Opportunists, however,
are conditional operators in the sense that they maximize expected utility
given the institutional environment. We introduce institutions for capture
and punishment to clarify their role in undermining or supporting not only
trustworthy behavior but, by extension, trust.3
Out of this structure, we derive an equilibrium amount of trustworthy
behavior and an equilibrium amount of trust. Then, we investigate how
trustworthy behavior and trust are influenced by differences in the mean and
standard deviation of the risk distribution. The usual story in the literature
is that a more cautious society trusts less, since trust involves making one’s
self vulnerable to cheating. However, our model brings out a countervailing
force that can dominate in certain cases. Because more cautious players have
a greater fear of capture and punishment, a larger number of type B players
will behave honestly. By backward induction, more A players will trust. It
is quite possible that more cautious societies will, paradoxically, trust more.
This is more likely to be true in groups of homogeneous societies – those with
3See Drago et al. (2009) for empirical support for the hypothesis that crime is sensitive
to expected punishment.
4
a low standard deviation of the distribution of caution. More heterogeneous
societies behave conventionally – those with greater average levels of caution
trust less.
Our results are important for empirical work relating trust to macroe-
conomic performance. First, we contend that trust is endogenous and so
empirical results demonstrating the importance of trust to output, invest-
ment, or other outcomes may be biased. Second, our results suggest that
trust and caution are related in a complex manner. We cannot simply say
that countries that demonstrate little trust are just very cautious.4 There is
no way to infer trust from an observation of average caution. Both results
suggest that the empirical work on trust and its importance to economic
outcomes needs further study.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the agents,
set out the trust game, and constrain the parameters. In Section 3, we focus
on the opportunists’ choice of whether or not to cheat on a contract. Section
4 defines the distribution of risk aversion (caution) and shows how the mean
and variance affect trustworthiness. In this section, we link trustworthiness
to different types of cultures based on their innate caution and degree of
cultural diversity. Section 5 is concerned with the determination of trust,
given that trustworthiness has already been determined and is known to A
4A different point concerns the validity of the standard trust question (a165 in the
World Values Survey (2006)). Miller and Mitamura (2003), using survey methods across
Japanese and American students, find evidence that the question captures caution instead
of trust.
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agents. In Section 6 we construct a measure of output per capita and show
how it is related to the distribution of caution. This allows us to show how
trust and output are related as we vary the moments of the distribution
across countries. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Game
Agents of type A consider initiating transactions with agents of type B that
they encounter randomly. To do so requires trust. No information about
B is available to A prior to her decision to trust; she only has aggregate
information on B’s trustworthiness, as described below.5 Failure to trust
means that no transaction is initiated or realized by the two parties in that
period. If an agent fails to make a transaction with another, we assume
that each produces 1 unit of a consumption good, which they consume that
period. We think of this outcome as the result of working alone: it is not
efficient, but it is sufficient for survival.
If a transaction is realized, then output in excess of 2 units is created and
split between A and B in a manner to be described below. Regardless of
type, Agent j receives utility of:
u (cj, ρj) =
c
1−ρj
j − 1
1− ρj (1)
5This makes the solution of our game straightfoward. In Tirole (1996), by contrast, A
receives a signal about the probability that B has cheated in the past. This gives rise to
multiple equilibria based on parameter values. That work does not, however, deal with
heterogeneity of risk aversion.
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where cj ≥ 1 is her consumption and −∞ < ρj <∞ is her rate of relative risk
aversion. Our agents are heterogeneous. Both A and B types are distributed
continuously according to their rate of risk aversion ρ. We will often refer to
ρ as an individual’s level of caution. Notice that when a transaction is not
realized, each individual receives cj = 1 so utility is equal to zero, no matter
what the value of ρ:
u (1, ρj) = 0 (2)
We also assume that a fraction of the B-agents are intrinsically trustwor-
thy and will never cheat in a transaction.6 There is ample support for this
assumption in the literature.7 The rest of the B-agents are opportunists who
may cheat or not, depending on the expected payoff.
The game is shown in Figure 1. Player A moves first from Point A.
She must decide whether to offer a contract to B for the joint production
of output. A decision to trust B means that the outcome for player A is
dependent on the behavior of player B and that B is contractually obligated
to fulfill the contract.8 If player A trusts, the game continues to node B; if
she does not, the game ends at Point a. Both A and B receive a payoff of 1 in
6Alternatively, we could assume that a certain fraction have a value for ρj so large that
they would never risk cheating.
7See Frank (1987), Sen (1977), and Tirole (1996) for examples. More recently, in
Tabellini (2008) some types are naturally more trustworthy than others.
8Without a contractual obligation, player B’s behavior cannot be characterized as ei-
ther trustworthy or not, and ipso facto, capture and punishment are moot. Institutions
would be irrelevant. In our view, trust is based on an agreed contract between A and
B, whether explicit or implicit. Otherwise, the game is a game of ’hope.’ See Breuer
and McDermott (2008). Fehr (2008), Ben-Ner and Putterman (2008), and Karlan (2005)
design experiments or conduct surveys and field work on trust and trustworthiness where
an obligation is involved.
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that case. The payoff to this outcome is shown in Figure 1 as the bracketed
pair [Apayoff , Bpayoff ] = [1, 1] at Point a.
Does A trust B and proceed? Her problem is that she does not know
B’s type: he may be intrinsically trustworthy or he might be an opportunist.
If she knew B were trustworthy, she would trust, initiate, conclude a trans-
action, and earn income of (1 + ym) following path ABb. Person B would
also earn (1 + ym). The payoff again is noted in brackets at the path’s end,
and the game ends. The open circle at node B, indicates that the choice is
made by nature: with probability RTW player A encounters an intrinsically
trustworthy B player.
If B is an opportunist – with probability (1− RTW ) – but acts honestly,
and fulfills the contract, then both A and B also receive the standard amount
(1 + ym), just as if B were intrinsically trustworthy. In Figure 1, this cor-
responds to path ABCc. But an opportunist may not act honestly. If he
cheats, he will be caught with exogenous probability Q. This parameter is
our measure of “institutions”: Q is high in societies that succeed in finding
and convicting criminals.
When B cheats, α units of output are transferred from A to B. A dead-
weight loss of β is also experienced by A. If B is caught – with probability
Q – he faces two penalties: φ is paid to the state as punishment (this also
represents a deadweight loss) and λ is paid to make restitution to A. In this
case, B’s total payoff is (1 + ym + α− φ− λ). Person A receives the amount
(1 + ym − α− β + λ). This is represented by path ABCDd in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Game of Trust and Trustworthiness
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If B cheats and is not caught – an event that occurs with probability
(1−Q) – then B receives (1 + ym + α) while A gets (1 + ym − α− β). This
possibility is captured with path ABCDe in Figure 1. Again, we represent
a choice made by nature with an open circle at node D.
The payoffs must conform to several conditions to ensure a solution. First,
it is necessary that
λ+ ym < α + β < 1 + ym (3)
This condition ensures that a trustor who is cheated, whether the cheater
is caught or not, receives income in the interval (0, 1). Consumption cannot
be negative and the initiator must prefer the work-alone option to be being
cheated, even if the thief is punished. Note that this requires λ < 1.
We also require:
α < φ+ λ < 1 + ym + α (4)
When this is satisfied, the income received by an opportunist that cheats
and is caught is in the interval (0, 1 + ym). This ensures that consumption
is positive but that cheating and getting caught is worse than cooperation
(acting trustworthy).
Based on her own level of risk aversion, Player A must use the information
available to her to calculate the expected utility from trusting. To see what
she must know to make a rational decision, we must first turn to the problem
facing the opportunist.
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3 The Opportunist’s Choice
The decision to cheat is equivalent to the purchase of a lottery ticket: with
probabilityQ the opportunist gets caught and ends up with (1 + ym + α− φ− λ);
with probability (1−Q) he goes free and gains (1 + ym + α). Thus, the ex-
pected utility from cheating for the opportunist is:
Qu (1 + ym + α− φ− λ, ρj) + (1−Q)u (1 + ym + α, ρj) (5)
On the other hand, playing trustworthy yields utility of:
u (1 + ym, ρj) (6)
The opportunist will be trustworthy only if (6) is greater than (5). That is,
for person j honesty is rational if:
u (1 + ym, ρj)−
{
Qu (1 + ym + α− φ− λ, ρj) +
+ (1−Q)u (1 + ym + α, ρj)
}
> 0 (7)
The interesting feature of this condition is that its satisfaction depends on
the value of ρj so that it can hold for some opportunists, but not for others.
Agents with a high value of ρ will, other things equal, act honestly compared
to agents with a low value of ρ. If the chance of apprehension Q is sufficiently
high, all risk averse opportunists will honor the trust extended to them. We
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derive this value by first setting ρ = 0 – representing the agent who is risk
neutral. Then, we set (7) equal to zero and solve for Q, which yields:
QM =
α
φ+ λ
(8)
This is the condition that makes the risk neutral opportunist indifferent be-
tween cheating and playing honest. For Q > QM , any risk averse opportunist
would play trustworthy.9 From condition (4) we know that QM is less than
one.
More generally, for any vector (Q, ym, α, φ, λ), there is a critical value of
ρ – call it ρc – such that an agent with ρj > ρc will play trustworthy. We find
this critical value by setting (7) to zero and letting the resulting expression
implicity define ρc:
ρc = C (Q) (9)
where C ′ < 0. The critical value ρc also depends on ym, α, φ, and λ but,
since we concentrate on Q, we ignore them in (9). In countries where the
chance of apprehension and conviction Q is high, the marginal opportunist
has a low level of risk aversion.
We illustrate many of our results below with numerical examples. Al-
ready, we have made one important calibrating assumption: the work-alone
option yields output (and consumption) of 1. This normalization is the
9Our focus on Q is somewhat arbitrary. We could just as easily express (8) as conditions
on φ , λ, or α such that for any φ > φM ≡ αQ−λ , λ > λM ≡ αQ−φ or α < αM ≡ Q(φ+λ),
risk averse opportunists would play honest.
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benchmark by which the other variables and parameters must be compared.
We are, moreover, constrained in our choice of parameters by conditions (3)
and (4). We begin by setting two values:
• ym = 3.0
• λ = 0.3
The first means that a completed transaction is three times more productive
than the work-alone process. The second says that restitution from B to A
(if B is caught) is 30% of the output from the work-alone option.
To set α and β, we adopt the following rules. We assume that the sum
α + β is exactly halfway through the interval defined by (3), which is (3.3,
4.0), given our choices for ym and λ. Then, we assume that α = 2β: the
amount stolen by B in a dishonest transaction (α) is twice the deadweight
loss that is also inflicted on A (β). Similarly, we assume that the sum φ+λ is
three-quarters of the range determined by (4). Since we have already set λ,
this is sufficient to determine the penalty suffered by B if he is caught (φ).10
The values that come out of this exercise are:
• α = 2.433
• β = 1.217
• φ = 5.133
10The reason we do this is so we can change ym and/or λ and the other three parameters
will automatically change to maintain the constraints in a reasonable way. Later, we show
that a doubling of ym and λ do not alter our main results.
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The baseline parameter values imply that QM =
2.43
5.13
= .448, so if society
captures (and convicts) criminals 45% or more of the time, no risk averse
opportunists would cheat (ρc = 0). In our baseline case, we consider a
country that has weaker institutions such that the probability of capture and
conviction is Q1 =
QM
2
= .224. In this case, the cut-off value is calculated
from (7) to be ρc1 = 1.18. Everyone with risk aversion greater than 1.18 in
the baseline society will act honestly.
4 The Distribution of Caution and Trustwor-
thy Behavior
We now turn to the distribution of risk aversion – or caution – in society,
which allows us to link individual behavior to aggregate outcomes. We as-
sume the distribution of caution ρ within a country is normal11 with mean µ
and standard deviation σ:
ρ ∼ N(µ, σ) (10)
We think of both moments as reflecting something fundamental about a na-
tion’s culture, or blend of cultures. In risk-loving, entrepreneurial societies,
for example, µ is low. In traditional, cautious societies, µ is high. In homoge-
neous societies, σ is low, regardless of the value of µ. Heterogeneous societies,
on the other hand, are made up of many different cultures and have a high
11We have also used a uniform distribution. The results are very similar.
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value of σ. Table 1 shows the four-way categorization based on the moments.
We can think of the United States as an example of the first kind of society
(the upper left corner of Table 1) and Japan as an example of the second
(the lower right corner).12
Table 1: Societal Categories and the Distribution of Caution
Mean Level of Caution
µlow µhigh
Standard
Deviation
σhigh Entrepreneurial
Heterogeneous
Cautious
Heterogeneous
of
Caution
σlow Entrepreneurial
Homogeneous
Cautious
Homogeneous
For our baseline case, we set the mean to µ1 ≡ .60 and the standard
deviation to σ1 = .50 because these values are similar to those found by Har-
rison et al. (2007) in their Danish field experiments.13 This distribution f (ρ)
is shown in Figure 2. These values ensure that when the chance of getting
caught is Q1 =
QM
2
( so ρc = 1.18, as previously discussed) then less than half
will play fair since µ < ρc. The dark area shows the fraction of opportunists
who act honestly when Q = Q1. In this case, 21.1% of opportunists act
trustworthily. The lighter area is the proportion of opportunists who choose
12There is little hard evidence that Japan is, on average, more cautious as a society than
the US. However, there is some survey evidence that does suggest that this is the case.
One piece of evidence comes from the World Values Survey (2006). Question c009 asks
people to select important features of a job: 15% in the US chose “Job security”; 34% did
so in Japan. More evidence comes from Hofstede’s Index of Uncertainty Avoidance: the
US score was 46%; Japan’s was 92%. These are measures of µ, if anything. We have no
information about σ except the general perception of cultural homogeneity in Japan.
13Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) and Harrison et al. (2005) all find similar values with
different experimental populations.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Opportunists by Caution
to cheat.
We call the fraction of opportunists acting in a trustworthy manner VTW .
When we refer to a nation’s trustworthiness we mean VTW + RTW , the sum
of the endogenous and exogenous components of trustworthy behavior. VTW
depends on three key parameters:
VTW = V (ρc, µ, σ) = V (C (Q) , µ, σ) (11)
where V1 < 0, V2 > 0, and V3 Q 0. The first two derivatives need little
explanation. If either the cut-off value falls or the mean rises, trustworthiness
in the country will increase. The effect of σ, however, is more complex and
we deal with it below.
Our main interest lies in in the effects of the parameters of the distribution
16
of risk aversion on trustworthiness and, eventually, trust. In keeping with the
conceptual matrix in Table 1, we consider values of the mean and standard
deviation in the following ranges:
0 < µ < 2.36
.25 < σ < 1.5
Figure 3 shows two extreme cases, one with the (µ, σ) pair of (2.36, 0.25),
and the other with (0, 1.5). As noted above, the first of might represent a
country like Japan, a cautious and homogeneous society; the second might
describe the United States, which is considered to be more entrepreneurial
and diverse. Now, imagine that both nations have the same institutions,
represented by Q = .135. This would result in a cut-off value of ρc2 = 1.8
in both countries. The more cautious and homogeneous nation – the one on
the right – will have a larger share of its population of opportunists playing
trustworthy than the risk-loving and heterogeneous nation.
We can gain insight into the effects of µ and σ on trustworthy behavior
from Figure 4, which shows various Iso-VTW lines. Every point represents a
different country: to continue our example, Japan would be located in the
lower right corner; the US in the upper left corner. Every line shows the
combination of µ and σ that keeps VTW equal to the indicated value, given
the same value for Q.
First, consider the effect of µ on VTW . As µ increases, given the value of Q
17
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Figure 3: Extreme Densities of Caution
– and ρc – we see from Figure 4 that the proportion of opportunists playing
trustworthy rises (V2 > 0). That is, moving horizontally – from countries
with low caution to those with high caution – we cross increasingly high
values of Iso-VTW curves. Greater caution corresponds to more trustworthy
behavior. The standard deviation influences the sensitivity of this effect
(lower σ makes the rate of conversion from untrustworthy to trustworthy
faster), but the direction is always positive. This effect is completely general
and does not depend on the values of the parameters chosen to illustrate it.14
The effect of σ is not as straightforward. As noted previously, an increase
in σ may increase or decrease the proportion of opportunists who act trust-
14If we double both ym and λ, our two independent parameters, Figure 4 is essentially
unchanged: there is a slight increase in ρc but nothing else. The other parameters (α, β,
and φ) are constrained by the rules outlined in Section 2 to guarantee that they remain
in the necessary ranges.
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Figure 4: The Effect of µ and σ on Trustworthiness
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worthy (V3 S 0). It depends only on the location of µ relative to ρc. To
see this, start with the central case of µ = ρc. Since the normal distribution
is symmetric, exactly 50% of opportunists play trustworthy, no matter what
the value of σ. An increase in the standard deviation will not alter the pro-
portions of opportunists who play trustworthy and those who do not. This
is represented by the vertical line above ρc1 = 1.18 in Figure 4.
Now assume that µ < ρc. In this case, VTW rises as the standard de-
viation σ rises. Using Figure 4, as σ rises, we are considering increasingly
heterogeneous societies. Heterogeneity leads to greater trustworthiness when
risk aversion is low.
We may think of this phenomenon in the following way. When µ < ρc,
the mass of trustworthy opportunists is concentrated in the upper tail of the
distribution. The central area and lower tail of the distribution are filled
with opportunists who are less cautious and take a risk by cheating. Now, a
higher σ increases the probability mass in the tails, while removing it from
the center. This shift, in essence, pulls equal numbers of people away from
the mean – who were cheating – and pushes them toward the upper and lower
tails. Those cheaters who cross ρc change status and now play fair. People
are pushed from the center toward the lower tail, too, but these opportunists
do not change status: they continue to cheat. As a result, VTW rises.
If µ > ρc, then VTW falls as σ increases. We see this on the righthand
side of Figure 4: as we move vertically through the Iso-VTW curves, their
values diminish. Increasingly heterogeneous societies are less trustworthy
20
now. We can make an argument based on the probability density as we did
above: as σ increases, more people move away from the mean and cross over
ρc to the lower end of the density. As they do so, more opportunists who
were trustworthy become cheaters. Those remaining above ρc do not change
status – so here the proportion who act trustworthy diminishes.15
Earlier we noted that, based on average caution and perceived homogene-
ity, Japan would be located in the lower right corner of Figure 4 and the US
would be in the upper left corner. The figure suggests that Japanese citi-
zens should demonstrate trustworthy behavior in larger numbers than their
American counterparts. Based on four questions in the World Values Survey
(2006) that ask about attitudes toward cheating, this does seem to be the
case. In three of the four questions, the Japanese answered in a manner that
indicated they were less willing to cheat. On the fourth, the two cultures
tied.16
These results suggest that a full explanation of trustworthy behavior re-
quires knowledge of both moments of these national distributions. In the
next section, we build on these results to show how trust is determined.
15We also tried the uniform distribution and the log normal distribution (which is ap-
propriate if one wishes to rule out the case of ρ < 0). Both worked very much like the
normal.
16The questions are F114 – F117. They ask if it is “ever justified” to cheat in certain
situations: claiming government benefits, riding a bus, paying taxes, or accepting a bribe.
The tie occured on the bribe question.
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5 Trust
5.1 The Initiator’s Choice and Equilibrium Trust
Now return to the decision faced by person A, who is deciding whether or
not to trust B. We assume that A knows RTW , the proportion of possible
partners who are intrinsically trustworthy. We also assume that she knows
enough about the distribution of opportunists f (ρ), the probability of getting
caught Q, and the penalties to cheaters, φ and λ, to calculate the value of
VTW at any moment.
In order to concentrate on the influence of the distribution of caution, we
adopt a simple view of the way that initiators are able to obtain information.
In particular, every new match is random and no information is conveyed
by the respondent, unlike in work of Tirole (1996) on collective reputations.
Each initiatior is informed about the means RTW and VTW but of nothing
else.
Initiators have utility function (1) just like opportunists. We assume
throughout that the initiator’s distribution of caution is the same as that
for the opportunists f (ρ). This is an important assumption and we make it
primarily to establish this case as the starting point: there seems to be no
good reason to differentiate the population of opportunists from the initiators
by risk aversion distribution. Moreover, it seems reasonable that in any
economy, people play both the role of agent A and agent B, depending on
the circumstances. There is no reason why their risk distribution should
22
change with their role.
If A does not trust, she gets a payoff of 1, which means a utility of
u (1, ρ) = 0. If she does trust and initiate, she chooses a lottery ticket with
the expected payoff:
Ei (UT ) = RTW u (1 + ym, ρi) +
(1−RTW )
{
VTWu (1 + ym, ρi) +
(1− VTW )
[
Qu (1 + ym − α− β + λ) +
(1−Q)u (1 + ym − α− β)
]}
(12)
As long as this expression exceeds 0, she will trust. The value of (12) is
inversely related to the individual’s level of caution ρ. For any set of parame-
ters, there is a value of ρ that is so high that an individual will not trust. We
call this critical value ρz. Individuals with a value of ρ > ρz are too afraid
(“cautious”) to risk getting cheated.
We derive the threshold value ρz by setting (12) equal to zero, and re-
garding the result as a relation that defines ρz as the implicit function:
ρz = Z (RTW , VTW ) (13)
where Z1 > 0, Z2 > 0.
17 The threshold – and therefore the overall level
of trust – rises if there are more intrinsically trustworthy people RTW or if
17We ignore ym, α, β, and λ – even though they affect this decision – to better focus on
the risk Q and the parameters µ and σ.
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opportunists are more likely to play fair VTW . Although RTW is exogenous,
VTW is given by Equation (11).
To find the threshold numerically, we need to set the value for RTW :
• RTW = .10
Given this value and the other baseline parameters we specified earlier, we
find that the threshold for trust is ρz1 = .16 (see Figure 2). All initiators
with a ρ value below ρz will trust; they are sufficiently brave to accept the
gamble of being cheated. This is the the area under the curve to the left of
the dashed line above ρz1 in Figure 2. We calculate this to be 18.8%.
Call the fraction who trust PT . From the discussion above, we may infer
that:
PT = Π (ρz, µ, σ) (14)
where ρz is given by (13). In this expression, Π1 > 0 and Π2 < 0, and Π3 Q 0.
We discuss the separate effects below.
5.2 Comparative Differences
There are four exogenous influences on a society’s level of trust: Q, RTW , µ,
and σ. The first of these is institutional and the other three are cultural.
5.2.1 Institutional Differences
The only institutional factor we have considered is the probabilty that a
cheater will be caught. Consider several societies with the same distribution
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of caution, but different institutions. Those with higher levels of Q will
have lower values of ρc by (9), which increases the fraction of opportunists
who play honestly VTW by (11). This, in turn, leads to higher values of ρz
by (13) and then to PT by (14). A greater chance of punishment makes
more opportunists honest, and this perception of trustworthy behavior leads
initiators to trust more.
5.2.2 Innately Trustworthy
Countries with a larger share of innately trustworthy types RTW have higher
levels of trust. The mechanism is straightforward and works by increasing
the expected success rate for any initiated transaction. Societies with high
RTW have a high cut-off ρz by (13), which, other things the same, generates
more trust.
5.2.3 The Moments of the Distribution of Caution
We now address the more complex relationship between trust and the mo-
ments of the distribution of risk behavior. In general, µ and σ have two
effects, a direct effect and an indirect effect on trust. By “direct effect”, we
mean the effect on PT holding the cut-off ρz fixed; that is, the last two partial
derivatives in (14). Trust is complicated by the “indirect effect”: the effect of
µ and σ on player B’s trustworthiness and therefore on the initiator’s percep-
tions about the trustworthiness of others. These work through VTW in (11),
which then affect ρz – see (13) – which, in turn, affects trust in (14).
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The indirect effect thus follows the following chain of causation:
(µ, σ)→ VTW → ρz → PT (15)
We begin our discussion with the effect of the mean on trust.
The Effect of the Mean
The direct effect of the mean is the easiest to understand since it refers to
the partial derivative of µ in (14), which is always negative. In countries with
higher values of µ, given ρz, initiators are more cautious on average, so they
trust less. A higher mean of risk aversion directly reduces trust. This effect
is often pointed out in the literature to suggest that cross-country empirical
measures of trust may really be measuring caution in those cultures.
A high value of µ, however, also means that more opportunists are cau-
tious so a random match is more likely to be trustworthy. With greater
trustworthy behavior, the cut-off value ρz is higher (see Figure 2). This
raises initiatiors’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of others and therefore
their willingnesss to trust. This is the indirect effect of a rise in µ on trust.
The indirect effect may well dominate the direct effect so that the net im-
pact of µ on PT may be positive. High-caution societies may trust more than
those that are less cautious.
For different values of µ the dominant effect depends on the standard
deviation of the distribution of risk, σ. At low values of σ, the indirect effect
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Figure 5: The Effect of µ and σ on Trust
on PT of a rise in µ is stronger, so trust rises as µ increases.
18 At high
values of σ, the direct effect dominates and so trust declines as µ increases.
We illustrate these effects using the set of Iso − PT curves in Figure 5. We
highlight the contour where PT = .50. Above this contour, trust exceeds
0.50; beneath the contour, trust is less than 0.50.
Consider what happens to trust when the standard deviation is relatively
low, say σ = .40, and µ increases. We see that in societies with higher
values of µ – moving horizontally across the graph – there is more trust. The
indirect, positive effect dominates, and is powerful: for any increase in µ,
the effect on PT is quite strong. If, on the other hand, σ = 1.4, the direct,
18At very low values of µ, the net effect is essentially zero.
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negative effect of µ on PT dominates, but it is weak: it takes a large increase
in µ to provide a modest decrease in PT .
Why does the standard deviation matter so much? If σ is large, then
as µ increases there are relatively few new opportunists playing fair, and
the trusters’ enhanced caution dominates the perception of a more honest
environment. In economies with a low value of σ, however, the opposite
occurs: ρz is quite sensitive to an increase in µ – so an initiator’s augmented
caution is overcome by more trustworthy behavior – the perception of which
raises trust.
The Effect of the Standard Deviation
Examination of Figure 5 shows that in societies with low µ, greater variability
of caution – a vertical movement through the Iso-PT curves – results in
greater trust. On the other hand, in those societies where µ is high, greater
variability of caution reduces trust. Although we may still think in terms of
the direct and indirect effects, there is no simple way to explain how they
interract. Even the direct effect of σ is ambiguous (Π3 S 0).
The pattern in Figure 5 is robust, however, to two kinds of changes. When
we use either a uniform distribution or a log normal distribution (both with
the same baseline µ and σ), the results are very similar. This is also true
when we double the values of ym and λ (keeping the other parameters within
their permitted ranges).
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5.3 Trust and Caution
We argued earlier that Japan would be located in the lower right corner of
Figure 5, based on its high average caution and relative cultural homogeneity.
The US would be located in the upper left corner, assuming that it is less
cautious and more diverse. Given the values of the Iso − PT contours in
Figure 5, we expect PUST < P
J
T : there would be less trust in the US than
in Japan. Using the standard trust question from the World Values Survey
(2006), this does appear to be the case. In the US, 36% answered the trust
question affirmatively as compared to 43% in Japan.
6 Aggregate Analysis
We began this paper noting that there have been many studies linking trust
to economic outcomes like per capita output. In this section, we show what
our model implies about aggregate economic activity.
Assume that there are N encounters every period between a player A and
a player B. Total output, on average, is governed by the payouts discussed
in Section 2 and will depend on the proportions of the individuals who trust,
who are innately trustworthy, and who behave trustworthily, as well as the
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losses and gains accruing to A and B. Total output is:
Y = (1− PT ) 2N + PTN
{
RTW2 (1 + ym) +
+(1−RTW )
[
VTW2(1 + ym)
+(1− VTW )
{
Q [2(1 + ym)− β − φ] +
+(1−Q) [2(1 + ym)− β]
}]}
(16)
Divide both sides by N and simplify to find an expression for income per
encounter y:
y = 2 + PT [2ym − (1−RTW ) (1− VTW ) (β +Qφ)] (17)
where PT is given by (14) and VTW by (11).
19
When the probability of punishment is extremely high, honest behavior
and trust will prevail: VTW = PT = 1. From (17), this means output per
capita y = 2 + 2ym = 8.0, given our baseline value of ym = 3.0. If, on the
other hand, there were no trust (PT = 0) then output would only be 2.0
units. In this sense, the model assigns a fourfold increase in output to trust.
This difference is purely arbitrary, in the sense that it does depend on our
baseline calibration. If we doubled the values of ym and λ – and adjusted the
other parameters so that the constraints (3) and (4) were still satisfied – the
19A version of this equation appeared in Breuer and McDermott (2008), who used it
to estimate the relative importance of trust and trustworthiness across countries. Notice
that because α and λ are transfers between A and B, they do not affect aggregate output.
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maximum effect of trust would be 7 to 1. However, we are most interested
in the relative effect on y of changing the exogenous parameters Q, RTW , µ,
and σ, not on the overall effect of trust.
We first consider the link between institutions and economic outcomes.
AlthoughQ enters negatively in (17), this is a partial effect that only accounts
for the reduction in y following the event of capture – the deadweight loss φ.
The indirect, positive effects of Q working through VTW and PT are actually
stronger so that the total effect is positive.20 Better institutions, in the form
of a greater rate of conviction for crime, raise output per person by increasing
the number of completed transactions.
A greater fraction of natively trustworthy agents RTW necessarily in-
creases aggregate output. This follows from (17), using (13) and (14). Both
the direct effect and the two indirect effects – in raising VTW and PT – work
in the same direction to increase the number of transactions.
Finally, we consider the effect of the distribution of caution on y. In
Figure 6 we show a series of Iso-y curves in (µ, σ) space. Holding σ constant,
countries with high levels of caution µ always have greater levels of y. This
means that the direct, negative effect of making initiators trust less is never
the dominant effect. Higher average caution gives countries higher levels
of VTW and PT , which means more transactions and greater numbers of
those concluded honestly. Output is greater in these countries. However,
20This result was robust to other assumptions about the distribution of risk aversion
and the values for ym and λ.
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Figure 6: The Effect of µ and σ on y
in societies with a large standard deviation σ, the effect of µ in raising y is
extremely weak. When σ = 1.4, for example, it takes a near tripling of µ to
raise y from 4.7 to 5.0.
The effect of the standard deviation of caution on output per capita de-
pends on the level of µ. For nations with a low value of µ – the ones we are
calling entrepreneurial – those with the highest σ will also have the highest
y. Societies that have a high value of µ – cautious societies – demonstrate
the reverse: among these, the ones who have a high σ will have lower living
standards.
What can we say, in the end, about trust and economic performance?
In our model, both are endogenous, so the relationship is not monotonic.
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Consider two countries with a high σ (say, 1.5 for both) but different values for
µ: Country 1 is imprudent or entrepreneurial – has a low µ – while Country
2 is cautious – has a high µ. As we have just seen, y is higher in Country
2 than in Country 1 (see Figure 6 ). Trust, however, is larger in Country
1 than in Country 2 (Figure 5). We would observe an inverse relationship
between trust and output in a sample of internally heterogeneous countries.
Had we taken groups of nations with low values for σ, we would have found
a direct relationship between output and trust across countries.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we constructed a theory of trust based on heterogeneity in the
risk aversion preferences of the population, which we consider to be a deep
cultural attribute. We showed that attitudes toward risk affect the desire to
be trustworthy and the willingness to trust. Our results call into question
the heuristic that more cautious societies trust less. Although this partial
effect is present, it is often dominated by an indirect effect. Greater average
caution will cause people to be more trustworthy, which prompts cautious
initiators to overcome their hesitancy to trust. We showed that the net effect
of caution on trust depended systematically on the standard deviation of
caution. If there is greater homogeneity in attitudes toward risk in a society
– a lower standard deviation – the indirect effect is more likely to dominate
and more caution will lead to more trust.
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Trustworthiness is instrumental in building trust in society. Society’s be-
havior toward risk, as well as its institutions, contributes to trustworthiness,
since acting honestly is, to some degree, a matter of balancing return and
risk. We showed that output per capita is always positively related to trust-
worthiness. Trust and output, however, are not monotonically related. It is
possible that in culturally diverse societies where risk attitudes vary widely,
higher trust is associated with lower standards of living.
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